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Indigenous power in international law has long been subsumed under the language
of international human rights, and we have turned ourselves blind to other
possibilities in international law that Indigenous peoples can rely upon. One such
option is international environmental law, which has seldom received sustained
scholarly attention. In her new book, Federica Cittadino “argues that a correct
interpretation / implementation of the international framework on the protection of
biodiversity must duly take into account the rights of indigenous peoples.” (p. 2)
She takes a decidedly anthropocentric turn in biodiversity protection as a global
public good, which is well in line with the links between environmental protection and
human rights (a central part of the argument), not to mention with the book’s ultimate
goal, enhancing Indigenous self-determination through environmental regimes.
Indigenous peoples and environmentalists have long been allies, drawing on a
view of Indigenous peoples’ identity and their special relationship to land and the
world as being necessarily mindful of the environment. That connection is not
without its unintended consequences: as Karen Engle has shown, to imagine
indigeneity as necessarily bounded to a harmonious relationship with nature can
pigeonhole and stunt Indigenous development, particularly when other segments of
the population are not subject to the same sustainability requirements to pursue their
own development project. It is not to say that sustainable development obligations do
not apply to everyone; the difference rather is one of where the requirement applies:
for Indigenous peoples, sustainability is a precondition for their rights, whereas
elsewhere sustainability is a limitation on rights.
Despite these possible unintended consequences, Cittadino engages with
biodiversity protection as a means to not only ground Indigenous rights, but also to
advance them in more effective ways through international human rights law. For
Cittadino’s purposes, international law is embodied primarily in the 2007 United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but regionally there is
also the 2016 American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (which is
unfortunately not engaged in the book). She buys into (and openly describes) the
idea of Indigenous peoples’ rights being founded upon a connection to nature –
and primarily land. The international legal environmental regime, also grounded on
territory, seamlessly becomes engaged in her argument.
First, the book helpfully describes the state of the art of Indigenous peoples’
protection in international human rights adjudication, with prominence given
to the pioneering jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Cittadino suggests that, even though much of the jurisprudence is grounded on
culture, land is also a key component of the case law, and ultimately land is the
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lynchpin of Indigenous peoples’ rights in international law, as a means of pursuing
self#determination.
I tend to subscribe to the view that self-determination has largely been abandoned
in the Indigenous context, at least in its thick, statehood-inducing form. What is left
of self-determination, in my view, is largely translated as cultural accommodation.
However, self-determination’s central positioning plays an important role in
Cittadino’s argument. Specifically, self-determination untangles Indigenous rights
from land and gives these rights a broader, more emancipatory, set of possibilities.
Sceptical as I remain about the feasibility of relying on self-determination, and the
dark sides of our reliance on it (it may, after all, blind us to other strategic possibilities
that are not already foreclosed), Cittadino makes a cogent case.
Cittadino uses the concept of self-determination to develop an interpretive approach
to all international law that affects Indigenous peoples. International law is to be
interpreted, applied, and implemented in the way that best serves Indigenous self-
determination. The interpretation goes beyond rights instruments, and encompasses
international environmental agreements, chiefly the Convention on Biological
Diversity, and the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing under it.
These two interlocking regimes are discussed in the context of “access and benefit-
sharing”, a formula usually uttered in one breath, but that Cittadino insightfully
analyses in its constitutive elements. Crucially, she demonstrates how these regimes
can more clearly articulate Indigenous rights that are only declared in very broad
terms in relevant international law, thereby advancing the state of Indigenous rights
in international law.
Cittadino then moves on to examine the matter of protected conservation areas
as a second case study on how international environmental regimes can advance
Indigenous rights. Specifically for the purposes of this review, she focuses on
the 1972 World Heritage Convention and its categories of natural heritage and
cultural landscapes (broadly defined as natural areas impacted by human activity).
She shows how this instrument has, over time, attempted to more openly engage
the wishes of the communities living in, with, and around heritage, and how her
interpretive framework can assist in engaging Indigenous communities specifically in
the management of World Heritage sites that often exclude human interaction in the
name of an ideal of pristine preservation.
I have argued elsewhere that international heritage law in its design and
implementation tends to overwhelmingly exclude communities from having a say
over the management of their own heritage in international law. Cittadino is more
hopeful, at least with respect to the World Heritage Convention, and her reasoning
also draws on the artificiality of the distinction between tangible and intangible
heritage, meaning that all heritage exists not because of its own intrinsic values,
but because of the way people interact with and safeguard said heritage, including
Indigenous communities.
Therefore, heritage only matters because people are central to it, and international
legal regimes (should) reflect that. However, her contagious optimism overlooks the
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stage management role played by regimes and stakeholders that do not necessarily
have Indigenous peoples’ rights and interests at heart. The rules of the game are not
meant to highlight the subaltern (in this case, Indigenous peoples) and their voice.
Their voices, when presented, are always mediated, filtered through categories
that may or may not fit their aspirations, but that were at any rate not designed by
Indigenous peoples. In this process of mediation and translation, agency and its
emancipatory promises are diluted.
In other words, while Cittadino’s argument is important in imagining what
international law can be, it also glosses over the tension between state interests and
sovereignty which couch many of these regimes, and Indigenous peoples’ rights,
whose interests are not always in line with states. She acknowledges those tensions
but does not go as far as working through their impacts on the picture she paints so
capably.
The book’s key contribution, however, still holds unabated in my view, and is a
message that should be heeded far and wide: regimes other than international
human rights law hold great and untapped potential for advancing goals we as
international lawyers tend to associate only with international law. Whether we are
talking about environmental, heritage, or myriad other regimes, we do not need to
always fall into the all-too-tempting trope of turning to international human rights
to promote emancipation. International human rights law pervades other areas of
international law just enough to give us a hook to use other normative frameworks to
promote human rights goals, in underutilized and often more sophisticated ways.
Cittadino’s book makes an important contribution to a number of conversations, and
deserves close attention, critical engagement, and replication in other contexts. We
can and should do more with international law if we think beyond silos, and, while
reality checks are useful, there is also plenty of room for ambitiously utopian and
sophisticated projects like this book’s.
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